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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the effects of minimum wages on the income and employment of individuals, 
using longitudinal data from Brazil’s Monthly Employment Survey over the 1982-1997 period. We use 
information on 541,194 individuals aged 15 to 65, for which we consider data from two interviews 
performed 12 months apart.  Our sample includes formal salaried workers (62%), informal salaried (20%) 
and self-employed (18%). We provide detailed estimates of minimum wage effects at different points of 
the complete wage distribution, and calculate both contemporaneous and lagged effects, for formal and 
informal workers. In order to provide some insight into the potential effects of minimum wages on family 
welfare and poverty, we obtain separate estimates for men and women, for workers under and above age 
21, and for household heads and non-heads. We find significant minimum wage effects across the whole 
wage distribution, and both in the formal and the informal sectors. We also find that the total impact of 
minimum wages on workers earnings (derived from current and lagged effects) is positive but smaller 
than the contemporaneous one. As for employment elasticities, our estimates suggest that they are 
negative for most low-wage workers, being lower in absolute value for formal salaried workers (around –
0.1 at the bottom of the wage distribution) than for low-wage informal salaried and self employed 
(between –0.25 and –0.35). Other results include higher earnings elasticities for men, adults and heads of 
households than for women, teenagers and non-heads, respectively.  
 
Resumo: 
O artigo investiga  os efeitos do salário mínimo sobre os rendimentos e o emprego de individuos, usando 
dados longitudinais da Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego do período 1982-1997. São utilizadas informações 
de 541.194 indivíduos de 15 a 65 anos, extraídas de duas entrevistas realizadas com um intervalo de 12 
meses. Consideramos individuos inicialmente empregados seja como assalariados com carteira (62%) ou 
sem carteira assinada (20%), seja como conta proprias (18%). Fornecemos estimativas detalhadas dos 
impactos do salário mínimo em diferentes puntos da distribuição de rendimentos e calculamos tanto 
efeitos contemporaneos quanto defasados. Também realizamos estimativas separadas, por sexo, idade e 
posição na família. Encontramos impactos significativos do salário mínimo sobre os rendimentos 
individuais ao longo de toda a distribuição de rendimentos, e tanto no setor formal quanto no informal. Os 
impactos combinados dos efeitos contemporaneos e defasados são positivos mas menores que os 
primeiros. As estimativas obtidas para as elasticidades-emprego são negativas e mostram-se menores em 
valor absoluto para os trabalhadores formais (cerca de –0.1 na base da distribuição) que para os informais 
(entre –0.25 e –0.35 para trabalhadores sem carteira e conta proprias, respectivamente). Outros resultados 
incluem maiores elasticidades de rendimentos para homens, adultos e chefes de família. 
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  In Brazil, as in other countries, the goal of the minimum wage legislation is to redistribute 
earnings to low-paid workers in order to assure the satisfaction of their basic needs.
1 Determining the 
level of the minimum wage that best accomplishes this goal is not, however, an easy task, as there are a 
number of trade-offs and indirect effects involved.  
The main emphasis in the academic literature has been on the potential of minimum wage 
increases to produce deleterious effects on the very poor workers they are intended to benefit. In 
particular, in a competitive setting positive wage effects could be compensated by possible negative 
impacts on employment. Indeed, higher minimum wages would lead employers to move back along their 
labor demand curves, causing a reduction in employment opportunities for low-skilled workers, 
particularly those for which the new minimum wage is binding.
2  As a consequence, one should expect an 
increase in the flow of workers from the formal, protected sector of the labor market, towards 
unemployment, inactivity or informal jobs. 
In developing countries with large informal sectors – such as Brazil – the latter effects are of 
particular concern. If minimum wages induce migration of workers from the formal to the informal 
sector, the corresponding increase in the supply of labor in the informal sector could, in principle, lower 
informal wages. There are, however, several countering effects that could lead to the opposite result (an 
increase in informal wages). First, the enlarged attractiveness of the formal sector after a minimum wage 
increase could lead more informal workers – and individuals out of the labor force – to look for jobs in 
the formal sector.
3 Second, employers could choose to respond to higher minimum wages by substituting 
away from registered towards unregistered informal workers.
4 Finally, there is considerable evidence that, 
at least in Brazil, minimum wages have been used as a numeraire not only in the protected formal sector 
of the labor market but also in the informal sector.
5 This could account for increases in informal wages 
even in the context of an increasing supply of informal workers. 
Although direct impacts of changes in the minimum wage should be expected to be largest on 
workers for whom the minimum is binding – e.g. workers whose earnings are in between the initial and 
the final level of the minimum wage – there are reasons to expect effects also outside this at-risk group, 
                                                 
1 See Foguel, Carneiro and Ramos (2000) for an account of the evolution of the Brazilian minimum wage legislation. 
2 There is considerable controversy about the size of the disemployment effects of minimum wages. The early research, mostly 
based on time-series, generated relatively small negative estimates, in general between –0.1 and –0.2 (Brown, Gilroy and 
Kohen, 1982). The more recent work has adopted a cross-sectional perspective with results varying from non-significant or 
even marginally positive employment elasticities (Card and Krueger, 1994; Machin and Manning 1994) to estimates between –
0.4 and –1.6 for people directly affected by minimum wage changes (Currie and Fallick 1993; Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 
1999). 
3As shown formally by Mincer (1976), when turnover rates are high relative to the elasticity of formal labor demand, a 
minimum wage hike may lead to a net flow of workers from the informal to the formal sector, and from inactivity into the labor 
force, as well as to an increase in informal wages and a reduction in informal employment. In Mincer's model, informal wages 
are equated to expected formal wages. It is worth noting, however, that because of unobservable intrinsic attributes of both 
formal and informal jobs, the corresponding expected wages in both sectors should not necessarily be equal in equilibrium. 
This is a plausible possibility if one adopts the view that the informal sector is not just the residual fraction of a dualistic labor 
market, but rather a potentially desirable destination for workers that choose between formality and informality on the basis of 
a rational cost-benefit analysis (Maloney, 1999).  
4 Needless to say, this is not a completely desirable outcome as it amounts to non-compliance with the minimum wage 
legislation, and would abate positive wage effects in the formal sector. However, as argued by Freeman (1996), in some 
circumstances, firms and employees may find it in their best interest not to comply with the minimum wage legislation. 
5 Neri (1997) shows that the fraction of workers that experienced wage increases identical to those in the minimum wage was, 
at least in the 1990s, larger for unregistered than for registered workers. Neri, Gonzaga and Camargo (2000) find that the 
percentage of workers that earn exactly one minimum wage is larger for informal (unregistered) workers (15% in 1996) than 
for the formal salaried (8%). The proportion of workers earning multiples of the minimum wage (0.5, 1, 1.5, 2 or 3) is also 
larger for informal (20%) than for formal workers (14%). Although to a smaller extent, even the self-employed show up as 
using minimum wages as some sort of numeraire: 8% earn multiples of the minimum wage.   
 
and possibly throughout the wage distribution. First, if the use of the minimum wage as a unit of account 
is a generalized practice in the labor market – the so-called numeraire effects – not only low-wage 
informal workers but also workers earning above the minimum, in both the formal and the informal 
sector, should be impacted. Secondly, in a competitive setting one should expect employers to respond to 
minimum wage increases by substituting away from workers whose productivity is valued below the new 
minimum. This would have the effect of increasing the demand for workers whose initial earnings and 
productivity were above the new minimum.
6 Still, this effect could be partially compensated if the 
heightened attractiveness of formal (and possibly informal) employment leads to increased rates of 
participation in the labor force – that is to larger flows of individuals out of school or homekeeping 
activities into employment or unemployment.  
One important question related to minimum wage effects has to do with the different timings with 
which the several above-mentioned effects operate. For instance, adjustments in wages could be expected 
to occur faster than employment effects, as firms take time to adjust the composition of their labor force. 
Voluntary transitions of individuals from inactivity towards the formal or the informal sectors, or from 
informality to formality, could also take more time to process themselves than do wage adjustments that 
follow legal or contractual obligations. As a consequence, one should not expect minimum wage effects 
to die out in a short period of time.  
In theory, lagged effects could either amplify or abate the initial impacts of changes in minimum 
wages, depending on the individuals’ position in the labor market and in the wage distribution. For 
instance, if the employment effects related to firms’ responses to changes in relative labor costs are 
slower than direct wage effects, then the lagged impact of minimum wage increases would be favorable to 
workers earning above the minimum but negative for those making less than the minimum. If, however, 
the use of the minimum wage as a numeraire is a widespread phenomenon, one could expect minimum 
wage increases to have inflationary effects that after some time could lead to real reductions in the 
earnings of all workers.
7 In this case, income effects for most workers would initially overshoot. 
Given that the objective of the minimum wage policy is that of redistributing earnings towards 
low-income families, one important issue has to do with the differential impact that minimum wages can 
have, according to personal characteristics, such as gender, age and status in the family (heads/non-
heads).
8 Those differences could arise from distinct labor supply behavior across those groups, reflected 
in the nature of the work relationship (e.g. temporary as opposed to stable), the extent of part-time work 
and the degree of attachment to the labor force. Moreover, if in normal conditions employers may 
discriminate against some types of workers – e.g. women – one could expect the same behavior in the 
context of adjustments to minimum wage increases. 
Because contributions to family income vary considerably by age, gender, and family status, 
differential responses to minimum wages across these groups are important to assess the impact of 
minimum wages on poverty. For instance, relatively larger income effects on heads of households would 
                                                 
6 In the case of reductions of the minimum wage, a symmetric decrease in the demand for workers earning above the initial 
minimum should be expected, as the employment perspectives of those earning below the initial minimum are improved. 
Abowd et al. (1999) study periods of real increases and reductions in the minimum wage, respectively in France and the United 
States, and find that “[workers] employed between two real minima have much lower subsequent employment probabilities in 
France and much lower prior employment probabilities in the U.S.” (p. 24). 
7 Freeman (1996) mentions the inflationary effects of minimum wages but implies that these effects are restricted to “minimum 
wage goods/services” and are proportional to the “minimum wage workers’ share of the cost of production” (p. 640). The point 
here is that widespread numeraire effects that lead to wage increases throughout the wage distribution could lead to larger 
increases in prices of a wider spectrum of goods. 
8 Abowd et al. (1999) estimate minimum wage-employment elasticities that vary considerably by age and gender. Most of the 
literature on disemployment effects has focused on youth. In Europe, as reported by Dolado et al. (1996), the evidence suggests 
that effects are worse for this group than for adults. Neumark and Washer (1995) provide evidence of disemployment effects 
on American teenagers, especially those for which the minimum wage is binding.   
 
be a positive result in terms of the policy’s goal of reducing poverty, and small income effects on the 
young would be less harmful than on adults.
9 As for women, it is often assumed that their earnings have a 
small impact on household income: this was one of the explicit motivations of the British government 
when it abolished the Wage Councils in 1993 (given that most minimum wage workers were women). It 
is not clear, however, that the above assumption has strong empirical support, as Machin and Manning 
(1996), for instance, quote British evidence against it. 
A related question that arises in this context is the extent to which low-income workers come from 
poor families.
10 In Brazil, as in other countries, women, young and non-head-of-household individuals are 
over-represented at the bottom of the wage distribution, where the beneficial effects of minimum wages 
are arguably concentrated. If the earnings of those workers are not an important component of family 
income, one could make the case that possible beneficial effects of minimum wages on low-income 
workers do not necessarily translate into proportional increases in the income of poor families.  Moreover, 
heads of households leaving in extreme poverty are often unemployed and are thus shielded from most 
beneficial effects of minimum wages. 
Given that the goal of the minimum wage policy is, in a nutshell, that of reducing poverty, one 
could argue that a relevant test of its effectiveness should be based on its impact on household income. 
This is not, however, the approach adopted in this paper. Rather, our more limited objective is that of 
estimating the effects of minimum wages on the income and employment of individuals, using 
longitudinal data from Brazil’s Monthly Employment Survey over the 1982-1997 period. Differently from 
previous research on minimum wage impacts in Brazil, we do not restrict the analysis to individuals 
earning one minimum or less, or to those earning multiples of the minimum. Instead, we follow Neumark, 
Schweitzer and Washer (2000) in providing detailed estimates of minimum wage effects at different 
points of the complete wage distribution, and calculate both contemporaneous and lagged effects. Given 
the importance of the informal sector in the Brazilian labor market, we provide estimates for both formal 
and informal salaried workers, and for self-employed individuals. We also estimate the impact of 
minimum wages on the probability of transitioning into different sectors of the labor market: out of 
salaried formal and informal work, and self-employment, and into unemployment and inactivity. Finally, 
in order to provide some insight into the potential effects of minimum wages on family welfare and 
poverty, we obtain separate estimates for men and women, for workers under and above age 21, and for 
household heads and non-heads.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section presents the data and 
methodology and the third section reports estimation results. The final section summarizes our main 
findings and offers concluding remarks. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
  
  The Monthly Employment Survey (Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego or PME) is a periodical survey 
of households aimed at providing monthly employment indicators. It has been performed by Brazil’s 
statistical agency (IBGE) since 1980, covering the metropolitan areas of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo 
Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Recife and Salvador.
11 One important advantage of the PME, compared to any 
                                                 
9 As put by Neumark, Schweitzer and Washer (2000), “[young workers] are likely to ‘grow out’ of minimum wages, [whereas] 
adults working at minimum wage jobs are more likely to be ‘permanent’ low wage workers” (p.12). 
10 Johnson and Browning (1983) show that in 1976 low-wage workers in the U.S. were evenly distributed across the household 
income distribution. Machin and Manning (1996) show that in the U.K. this distribution is more skewed towards poor 
households but a considerable fraction of low-wage workers pertains to relatively rich households. Dolado et al. (1996) present 
similar evidence for France, the Netherlands and Spain. In France and the U.K. more than 30% of those at the bottom of the 
wage distribution pertain to families at the top 50% of the household income distribution. 
11 For descriptions of the methodology of the Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego, see Sedlacek, Barros and Varandas (1990), IBGE 
(1991), Bivar (1993) and Oliveira (1999).  
 
other household survey available in Brazil, is that it is designed as a rotating panel, so one can perform 
longitudinal comparisons across individuals. Each household is surveyed 4 consecutive months and is 
then dropped from the sample for 8 months, after which it is reintroduced for another 4 months. The 
rotation procedure is such that each month one fourth of the sample is substituted by households from a 
new panel. Thus, after 4 months the whole initial sample has been rotated and after 8 months a third 
different sample is being surveyed. After 12 months the initial sample is reencountered. Over a period of 
two years, three different panels of households are surveyed, and the process starts again with three new 
panels.  
In this paper, we use a data set that we constructed from 22 different panels surveyed in the 
months of January, May and September, between 1982 and 1997.
12 The final sample includes information 
on 541,194 individuals, for which we consider data from two interviews performed 12 months apart.  The 
sample is restricted to individuals aged 15 to 65 in the first interview, that were (initially) employed as 
formal salaried workers (62% of our sample), informal salaried (20%) or self-employed (18%). We 
excluded those individuals whose activities in the second interview were unknown, as well as those that 
had become unpaid workers or retirees.
13 The matching of individuals across interviews was performed 
on the basis of household identification numbers, date of birth, gender and years of schooling.
14 All 
employed individuals with missing earnings information were dropped, as were those that experienced 
yearly changes in real earnings of more than 1000%. The resulting data set was merged with information 
on minimum wages and consumer price indexes, which were used as deflators.
15 The sample was then 
restricted to individuals earning between 0.5 and 40 minimum wages. 
  As in Neumark et al. (2000), we estimate the impact of changes in real minimum wages (mw) on 
changes in real monthly earnings (w), allowing for different effects throughout the wage distribution and 
for lagged effects. We control for personal characteristics (X), as well as for month (M), period (P) and 
metropolitan area (S) effects. Since Brazil has a unique federal minimum wage policy since May 1984, 
the identification of the impact of the minimum wage comes mostly from its temporal variation. 
However, we also exploit, up to that month, the state-level variation in minimum wages.
16 Our basic 
specification is as follows: 
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12 We have attempted to cover all panels surveyed between May 1982 and May 1997. The dates of the (initial) interviews are 
as follows: May and September of 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992 and 1994; January of 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 
1994 and 1996; May of 1996. 
13 The reason for excluding the retirees is that we ignore the value of the corresponding pensions. We did, however, keep the 
workers that in the second period had become unemployed, students, or homekeepers, and assumed that they had zero earnings.  
14 We only kept the individuals that experienced no change in their years of schooling across interviews, and those that 
experienced a one year increase and were enrolled in school at the time of either the first or the second interview.  
15 The earnings information provided in the Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego is referred to the month previous to the interview. 
We thus used minimum wages and price indexes corresponding to those months. As deflator, we used IBGE’s Índice Nacional 
de Preços ao Consumidor Geral. As in Ferreira and Barros (1999), we applied the now standard procedure of upwardly 
adjusting that index by 1.2199, starting in July 1994, to account for the actual price increases that took place in June of 1994 
and were not computed into July’s index. All real values mentioned in the paper are expressed in May 1997 reais. The source 
of the minimum wage series is Brazil’s Labor Ministry and, for the series of Recife and Salvador  up to April 1984, Foguel 
(1998). 
16 In practice, the 6 metro areas covered by the PME can be divided in two groups with common minimum wages between 
1981 and 1984. Over this period, minimum wages in Recife and Salvador were on average 14% lower than those in the other 4 
metro areas. However, these differences declined over time – from being 17% below the cities in the southeast to 12% below at 
the end of the period.  
 
The subscript i is referred to the individual, and the subscripts 0, 1 and 2 denote observations from a year 
before the first interview, and from the first and second interviews respectively (hereafter “years 0, 1 and 
2”).  For sake of notation simplicity we do not include subscripts for metro area, year and month.  
In order to allow for different impacts of minimum wage changes across the distribution of wages, 
both the current and the lagged rates of growth of the minimum are interacted with a set of dummy 
variables Rj that describe different positions in the wage distribution. We use 13 such Rj variables, defined 
as of year 1 on the basis of the individual’s wage relative to the minimum wage.
17 Thus, for example, R1 
refers to individuals whose earnings are 0.9 minimum wages or less, R2 refers to those earning between 
0.9 and 1.1 minima, etc. (see table 1 for details on the ranges’ definitions).  
The Rj variables are also included freestanding (omitting the dummy for the highest wage range) 
and as interactions with the ratio of the individual’s wage to the minimum wage (as of year 1). These 
variables capture, respectively, different rates of change in wages across the wage distribution – for 
reasons unrelated to minimum wages – and different rates of change of wages within the ranges defined 
by the Rj variables.  
We control for the following personal characteristics (in X), defined as of year 1: gender, years of 
education
18, a dummy for individuals that completed an additional year of schooling between years 1 and 
2, experience and experience squared (both in year 1). We include month dummy variables (M) for May 
and September (the excluded category being January) expecting to capture seasonal factors that could 
potentially influence wage growth. To control for the effects of varying macroeconomic conditions we 
include dummy variables (P) defined as of year 1 for the following periods: 1982-83, 1984-86, 1987-89 
and 1990-92 (1994-96 is the excluded period). These variables are interacted with metropolitan area 
dummies (S) in order to control for the fact that the impact of macroeconomic shocks can vary across 
regions.  
Our main interest resides in the estimated β j coefficients, which capture the percent 
contemporaneous change in earnings associated with a unit percent change in the minimum wage, for 
individuals whose wages relative to the minimum are positioned in the j range (those for which the Rj 
dummy is activated). We are also interested in long-run effects, although their calculation is not as 
simples as usual – e.g. summing up β j and β
L
j. This is because over time workers can change from one 
range to another, say from j to k, so that the relevant parameters are in fact β j and β
L
k. Thus, to calculate 
“total” effects one needs to predict the wage range of each worker a year after the initial change in the 
minimum, and consider the lagged effect for this new range. This procedure must also be followed for the 
counterfactual situation of no change in the minimum, since workers may experience significant wage 
growth (and range changes) even in the absence of minimum wage movements.  
In practice, we first assume that no change in the minimum wage occurred between years 0 and 1, 
and use the parameter estimates from equation (1) to predict wages in year 2 in each of two hypothesis 
regarding the change in the minimum between years 1 and 2: a 10% increase and, for the counterfactual, 
no change in the minimum. These predicted wages are used to re-classify individuals in terms of their 
wages relative to the minimum, and new sets of Rj variables are defined (for both the cases of a 10% 
contemporaneous increase and of no change in the minimum). The new sets of predicted wages and Rj 
variables are then re-coded as if they were referent to period 1 (and not 2). Then, using these variables and 
assuming that there was no contemporaneous change in the minimum (between 1 and 2), we predict the 
                                                 
17 If one had three years of data for each individual, a more flexible specification could be used, including also Rj variables 
dependent on wi 0 and mw0, and interacting the lagged rate of change of the minimum with these variables (instead of using Rj 
variables defined as of year 1). As shown by Neumark et al. (2000), the adopted specification amounts to assuming that, 
conditioning upon the ratio of wi1 to mw1, “the individual’s wage history does not matter”(p. 13). That is, the effect in year 2 of 
a change in the minimum that occurred between years 0 and 1 does not depend on the path of wages up to w1.   
18 We adopt a flexible specification, using one dummy variable for each number of years of schooling up to fourteen, a dummy 
for individuals with four or more years of under-graduate education, and a dummy for those with some graduate education (the 
excluded education category is “zero years of schooling”).  
 
effect on earnings of, respectively, a lagged 10% increase and, for the counterfactual, no change in the 
lagged minimum (between 0 and 1). Total minimum wage effects are then calculated as the compounded 
change in wages after a contemporaneous and a lagged 10% increase in the minimum, minus the 
corresponding counterfactual compounded change in wages if the minimum had stayed constant in both 
years. 
The described estimation procedure is applied to three categories of workers (as of year 1): formal 
salaried (employees registered with the Brazilian Labor Ministry), informal salaried (unregistered 
employees) and self-employed. In order to distinguish “pure” minimum wage effects on earnings from 
those that follow from employment effects, we consider, for each category of workers, four types of 
samples. First, we restrict ourselves to the workers that in year 2 remain in the same sector of the labor 
market than in year 1 (formal salaried, informal salaried or self-employed). We then include, sequentially, 
the workers that in year 2 were employed in a different sector of the labor market or had become 
employers, those that were unemployed, and those that were out of the labor force (in school or as 
homekeepers).  
The comparison of the results obtained with these various types of samples provides indirect 
evidence on the impact that minimum wage changes can have on the flow of workers that transition 
between formality and informality, employment and unemployment, activity and inactivity.  
 
3. Results  
  
Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 1 through 3 report descriptive statistics for workers that in year 1 were, respectively, formal 
salaried, informal salaried and self-employed. In each table, the left panel covers the workers that in year 
2 remained in the same sector of the labor market as in year 1. The samples in the right panel also include 
workers that in year 2 had moved to another sector of the labor market, and those that had become 
unemployed or inactives (moving into school or homekeeping). 
  As expected, the fraction of the workforce that earns less than the minimum is much larger in the 
informal (informal salaried and self-employed) than in the formal sector – less than 1.5% in the latter vs. 
up to 15% in the former. The share of the workers whose earnings are close to the minimum is however 
much more similar across sectors – being largest for the informal salaried. This suggests that, as argued 
by Neri et al. (2000), the minimum wage does have a considerable influence on the wage setting process 
in the unprotected informal sector. Earnings in this sector are, however, systematically lower than in the 
informal sector, particularly in the self-employed segment. 
  Regarding the personal characteristics of workers across the wage distribution, it is clear that in 
the three segments of the labor market, education, age, and the proportions of men and household heads 
increase monotonically with individuals’ wages relative to the minimum. The rate of change in earnings 
(between years 1 and 2), however, has a negative monotonic relation with individuals’ earnings. At the 
bottom of the wage distribution, that rate is largest for formal salaried and smallest for informal salaried 
workers. Particularly in the samples in the left panels, year 2 earnings of workers in the lowest wage 
ranges are comparable to year 1 earnings of workers located in the immediately higher wage range. To 
some extent, this suggests that some of the lowest paid workers may stay only temporarily at the very 
bottom of the wage distribution. 
As for the comparison of the samples in the left and the right hand side panels, it appears that 
there’s a somewhat larger proportion of women, young individuals and non-heads of households among 
the workers that switch employment status between years 1 and 2. However, among the individuals in the 
ranges at the bottom of the wage distribution, those that stay in their initial employment status are 
somewhat less educated than those that move into a new status. 
It is also worth noting that some personal characteristics are clearly different across sectors of the 
labor market. For instance, somewhat surprisingly, informal salaried workers are more educated than their  
 
formal counterparts. Self-employed workers, however, have on average between two and three years of 
schooling less than the rest of the workers (although the difference is smaller at the bottom of the wage 
distribution). Since the self-employed are also considerably older (40.5 years old on average vs. 33.5 and 
34.3 for formal and informal salaried respectively), their labor market experience is larger than that of 
salaried (formal or informal) workers by around 9 years. Workers aged less than 21 earning around one 
minimum wage are only 6% among the self-employed, but represent 23% and 34% of the formal and 
informal salaried, respectively. As for gender, the proportion of women is on average largest among the 
informal salaried, although this ordering is inverted at the bottom of the wage distribution. Finally, heads 
of household are most prevalent among the self-employed, and least frequent among the informal 
salaried. 
 
Formal Salaried Workers 
 Estimates  of  β j and β
L
j (equation 1) for formal salaried workers are reported in table 4. The results 
in columns (1) and (1’) correspond to the sample of individuals that worked as formal salaried in both 
years 1 and 2. The estimates suggest significant positive effects of minimum wages on workers’ earnings 
across all the wage distribution. Impacts are largest at the bottom and decline monotonically as one goes 
up over that distribution. The estimated elasticities are as high as 1.43 for those below 0.9 minima (1.08 
for those at or around the minimum) and as low as 0.39 for those making more than 40 minima.  
  The results reported in columns (2), (3) and (4) indicate somewhat lower effects, suggesting that 
minimum wages could lead to larger flows out of formal employment into other segments of the labor 
market (mainly towards informality), unemployment and inactivity. However, most of the estimated 
elasticities (for a given range of wages) are not significantly different from each other – they fall into each 
others’ 95% confidence intervals. Only in column (4), when all the above mentioned possible year 2 
employment status are considered simultaneously, and for the bottom wage ranges, the estimated 
elasticities are statistically lower than those in column (1). The implied employment elasticities are quite 
small, which is consistent with the early literature on the subject: for workers earning below 0.9 minimum 
wages and between 0.9 and 1.1 minima, a 10% minimum wage increase would reduce the probability of 
employment by, respectively, 1.6% and 0.9%.
19  
Except for the workers at the very bottom of the distribution, lagged income effects are negative and 
significant, which suggests that part of the initial gains derived from minimum wage increases are lost in 
the following year.
20 Total effects of a 10% increase in the minimum are shown in figures 1 and 2, 
respectively for the first and the second year (the first year results basically reproduce the estimates for the 
“current” period in table 4). Year 2 effects are uniformly lower than current effects, especially for workers 
located relatively high in the wage distribution. Indeed, up to 2 minimum wages, total effects are more 
than 55% of current effects; they are below 40% of initial effects for workers earning between 4 and 9 
minima, and less than 20% above 9 minima.  
As for total employment elasticities, derived from the comparison of total effects for the sample of 
individuals working in year 2 and the largest sample, they are smaller than current ones: -0.08 and -0.05, 
respectively, for workers in the two bottom wage ranges. Thus, the second period impact on the 
employment of low-paid workers partially compensates initial disemployment effects, which is consistent 
with a lagged real decline in the minimum wage. 
 
                                                 
19 We obtain these elasticities from the comparison of columns (2) and (4). Consider, for example, the bottom range: after a 
10% minimum wage increase, 98.4% of workers experience an increase of 13.95% in their earnings and 1.6% loose their jobs 
so they experience a 100% reduction in earnings; the result is an average increase of (98.4*.1395) + (1.6*-1)= 12.13%. 
20 It is worth noting that total effects can be lower than current effects even if the coefficient on lagged minimum wage growth 
is positive or non-significant for the corresponding wage range. This is because minimum wage hikes may lead workers to 
move to higher ranges, where “natural” wage growth (for reasons unrelated to minimum wages) is lower.  
 
 
Informal Salaried Workers 
  Although somewhat smaller than the corresponding elasticities for formal salaried workers, first 
year income elasticities for unregistered workers (table 5) are also uniformly positive and significant over 
the whole wage distribution, suggesting strong numeraire minimum wage effects also in the informal 
salaried sector. However, as seen in figures 3 and 4, both current and total income effects decline at a 
faster rate as one moves up along the wage distribution of informal salaried workers. Not surprisingly, 
total effects as a fraction of current effects are smaller than in the formal salaried sector, which indicates 
that in this unprotected sector a larger fraction of the initial wage increase is lost over the second year. 
The current elasticities in columns (2) and (3) are somewhat larger although not statistically different 
from those in (1). The only exception is given by the workers earning less than 0.9 minima: in the sample 
that includes individuals that move into another sector of the labor market we find a 13.9% wage increase 
after a 10% minimum wage hike, compared to 11.8% for workers that stay as informal salaried in year 2. 
This suggests that, for those workers, an increase in the minimum wage enlarges the probability of 
moving from informal salaried work to another sector of the labor market (mainly formal salaried 
employment and self employment) with, on average, a corresponding increase in earnings. 
As before, the results in column (4) are significantly lower than in the previous columns, at least for 
workers earning up to 1.5 minima. The implied employment elasticities derived from the comparison of 
(2) and (4) are larger than for the formal salaried sector: respectively -0.35 and -0.25 for the two bottom 
wage ranges in the first year; -0.15 and –0.05 respectively in the second year. A possible interpretation for 
this somewhat puzzling result is that some informal salaried workers, motivated by the increased 
attractiveness of the formal sector, queue for jobs in the formal sector. Alternatively, one could think that 
after the minimum wage increase some non-head of household individuals are able to quit the labor 
market thanks to the increased earnings of other family members. 
 
Self-Employed Workers 
As shown in table 6, the self-employed are also benefited by minimum wage increases, with earnings 
elasticities that, in the case of individuals earning around one minimum and staying in their initial 
employment status are significantly larger (1.32) than for formal and informal salaried workers 
(respectively 1.08 and 1.03). Income effects are also significant for higher wage ranges, at least up to 5 
minimum wages. Lagged effects, however, are significant only for a few wage ranges and even then they 
are positive. Thus, it does not surprise to find total effects that are quite close to current effects.
21 
  The earnings elasticities derived from the samples that include workers that switched self-
employment for other jobs (column 2) and for unemployment (column 3) are not significantly different 
from those in column (1), where only the workers that are still self-employed in year 2 are covered. When 
workers that quit the labor market are added to the sample (column 4), however, earnings elasticities 
become significantly smaller, at least for the two wage ranges at the bottom of the distribution. In this 
case, the reported results suggest year 1 negative employment elasticities (respectively -0.34 and -0.29) 
that are comparable to those encountered for informal salaried workers, and total employment elasticities 
that are larger than those for formal and informal salaried workers (-0.16 for both bottom ranges). As in 
the case of the informal salaried, these disemployment effects could be associated to either larger 
incentives to look for jobs in other segments of the labor market, or to a reduced need to work due to 
possible positive effects of the minimum hike on family income.  
One notable difference between the self-employed results and those for the other types of workers is 
that although earnings elasticities tend to decline as one moves up in the wage distribution, that reduction 
is not monotonic. Thus, for example, the elasticities for those making between 4 and 5 minimum wages 
                                                 
21 Because of space constraints we do not report total effects for self-employed workers. Results are available from the author 
on request.   
 
are larger than for workers who earn between 1.5 and 4 minima. One possible explanation for this is that 
at least some of the self-employed workers are benefited by the increased purchasing power of their 
clients – especially when the latter are minimum wage workers. 
 
Gender 
We have also estimated earnings elasticities separately for men and women, for the three segments of 
the labor market hereby considered.
22 Among formal salaried workers, elasticities are larger for men than 
for women in most wage ranges – the only exceptions being workers earning between 3.5 and 5 minimum 
wages. When employment effects are not taken into account, these differences are statistically significant 
only between 1.1 and 2 minimum wages. However, when one uses the samples that includes workers that 
changed employment status, the difference between men and women elasticities is statistically significant 
for all ranges up to 3.5 minima. As for the differences between “pure” earnings elasticities and those 
derived from the larger samples, they are greater for women than for men, suggesting that among formal 
salaried workers disemployment effects are more important for women. 
Similar results are encountered in the informal salaried sector, where women also display lower 
earning elasticities, especially at the bottom of the distribution and when disemployment effects are taken 
into account. Thus, for example, men earning around one minimum wage experience an 11.4% increase 
in earnings after a 10% increase in minimum wages, while the increase for women is only 5.9%. 
Disemployment effects, derived from comparing elasticities between samples in which non-working 
individuals in year 2 are or not included, also suggest that the negative impact on women employment is 
much larger than for men. For workers earning below 0.9 minima or between 0.9 and 1.1 minima, a 10% 
increase in the minimum causes an employment reduction of, respectively 1.4% and 1.6% on men; for 
women the corresponding reductions are 4.8% and 3.0%.
23 Among the self-employed, women are also 
disfavored in terms of their lower earnings elasticities, at least for workers earning up to 2.5 minima. 
Disemployment elasticities are also larger for women, especially at the bottom of the wage distribution: 
respectively -0.36 and -0.35 in the first two ranges, compared to -0.18 and -0.12 for men. 
 
Age 
We repeated the estimation for samples of workers aged 21 and older (“adults”) and workers aged 15 
to 20 years old (“teenagers”). In the case of formal salaried workers, minimum wage effects on earnings 
are significant across most of the wage distribution, for both teenagers and adults. However, earning 
elasticities are not significantly different from zero for informal salaried teenagers making more than 2.0 
minimum wages, and for self-employed teenagers earning more than 1.1 minima. In general, teenagers are 
affected by minimum wages increases they are less favored than adults, as their earnings increase by a 
significantly smaller amount. This is true for formal salaried workers earning up to 2.5 minimum wages, 
for informal salaried making between 1.1 and 2.0 minima, and for self-employed workers earning 
between 0.9 and 1.1 minimum wages.
24  
As for employment elasticities, results are mixed across sectors of the labor market. At least at the 
bottom of the wage distribution (workers earning less than 1.1 minimum wages) formal salaried teenagers 
are more responsive to minimum wage increases than adults are. The same is true for informal salaried 
                                                 
22 Also because of space constraints we do not report results by gender, age and household status. Results are available from 
the author on request. 
23 It is worth noting that in the range below 0.9 minimum wages, the pure earnings elasticity for men (0.78) is significantly 
below that of women (1.34). However, these difference vanishes when one uses the sample that includes individuals that in 
year 2 are working in other sectors of the labor market (because of space limitations we do not report these results). It thus 
appears that after minimum wage hikes men at the very bottom of the wage distribution are more likely than women to move to 
better jobs.  
24 One exception worthy of note is given by the self-employed teenagers earning less than 0.9 minimum wages, whose income 
elasticity is larger than for their adult counterparts.  
 
teenagers earning less than 0.9 minima: in this range their employment elasticity is –0.38 compared to –
0.08 for adults. However, for the self-employed the elasticities of employment with respect to minimum 
wages are larger in absolute value for adults, as they also are in the informal salaried sector for workers 
that earn around one minimum.  
 
Heads and Non-Heads of Household 
Overall, earnings elasticities are larger for heads than for non-heads of households, especially 
when disemployment effects are taken into account and for workers making up to 2.5 minimum wages. In 
the case of formal salaried workers, the larger effect on heads of households is also found for the sample 
of workers that stay in the same employment status in year 2. This, however, is not the case in the 
informal salaried and the self-employment sectors, in which the larger earnings elasticities for heads of 
households can be attributed to a larger responsiveness of employment to minimum wages. Indeed, 
employment elasticities are quite similar among the formal salaried, but in the other sectors they are larger 
in absolute value for non-heads of household. Among the informal salaried, for example, elasticities in 
the two bottom wage ranges are –0.37 and –0.24 for non-heads, compared to –0.16 and –0.19 for heads of 




  This paper has shown that the effects of minimum wages on monthly real earnings of Brazilian 
workers are not restricted to those earning around or below one minimum wage in the formal protected 
sector. Rather, significant minimum wage effects appear to be present across the whole wage distribution, 
and they seem to affect not only formal but also informal salaried, as well as self-employed workers.  
Significant effects on workers with earnings above the minimum wage could be interpreted as the 
result of a change in the composition of the workforce of firms that substitute away from minimum wage 
workers. Moreover, the fact that these effects decline with earnings could be thought as the result of a 
declining degree of substitutability between minimum wage workers and other workers, as one goes up in 
the wage distribution. However, since sizeable minimum wage effects are present even very high in that 
distribution, and in the formal as well as in the informal sectors of the labor market, it is reasonable to 
think that another, complementary, explanation could be appropriate. Namely, our findings can be 
thought of as supportive evidence for the existence of so-called numeraire effects. Thus, even workers 
whose earnings are well above the minimum and workers in the informal sector could be setting their 
earnings in terms of minimum wages, which would then serve as a unit of account voluntary chosen by 
employers, employees and self-employed, especially at the bottom of the wage distribution. 
We have also calculated total effects of minimum wage changes, which take into account not only 
current but also lagged effects. For most workers, we have found that total changes in workers’ earnings 
are smaller than current ones, although total effects are still positive. Once again, we believe that two 
possible interpretations could apply to this finding. In the case of low-wage workers, earnings could 
overshoot after a minimum wage hike because after some time employers could substitute away from 
these workers. This would not explain, however, the fact that workers earning above the minimum are 
also affected adversely by lagged effects, as those workers should be benefited by the above mentioned 
changes in the mix of the workforce. An alternative interpretation could be that minimum wage hikes 
could have inflationary effects derived from the fact that, thanks to numeraire effects, not only low-wage 
workers but also most of the labor force would experience wage increases. Thus, inflation would erode 
part of the wage gains experienced by most workers, especially those with lower bargaining power – 
which could explain our finding of lower total effects among the informal salaried and relatively larger 
total effects among the self-employed. 
An additional finding of this paper is the existence of negative elasticities of employment with 
respect to minimum wages. We have derived those elasticities indirectly, by comparing earnings effects  
 
between samples of workers that stay employed and samples that also include workers that became 
unemployed or moved out of the labor force. Although our estimates are relatively low in the case of the 
formal salaried sector – around –0.1 at the bottom of the wage distribution – they are larger in absolute 
value for low-wage informal salaried and self employed (between –0.25 and –0.35). These results are 
consistent with informal workers moving into the formal sector because of its increased attractiveness 
after a minimum wage increase, or moving out of the labor force motivated either by lower employment 
prospects or by increases in household income brought about by the higher earnings of other family 
members. 
Since the goal of the minimum wage policy is that of reducing poverty, the most relevant of its 
effects should be those on the individuals that are most likely to be primary wage earners of low-income 
families. However, as suggested by our data, individuals at the bottom of the Brazilian wage distribution 
– arguably the most affected by minimum wages – are more likely to be women, young and non-head of 
household. Thus, unless the responsiveness to minimum wage changes varies – in the “right” direction – 
by gender, age and status in the household, minimum wage effects on low-wage individuals  could 
overstate the corresponding effects on low-income households.   
With this motivation, we have provided separate estimates for men and women, teenagers and 
adults, and heads and non-heads of household. Our results suggest that there are in fact considerable 
differences in earnings and employment elasticities across individuals with different demographic 
characteristics. Moreover, these differences are such that they minimize the possibility of income effects 
on low-wage individuals overstating income effects on poor households. Indeed, we find that the earnings 
of men and heads of households are more affected by minimum wages than those of women and non-
heads, respectively. Also, we find negative employment elasticities that are larger in absolute value for 
the latter groups. These results apply to both the formal and the informal sectors. However, in the 
informal sector, most of the larger earnings effects for heads of household follow from the fact that they 
are less likely to change their employment status because of minimum wage changes than non-heads are. 
As for the results by age, we find that adults have larger earnings elasticities. In fact, in the informal 
sector the income of teenagers is only affected by minimum wages at the bottom of the wage distribution. 
The comparisons of employment elasticities by age provide mixed results. Teenagers are more affected 
than adults in the formal salaried sector and at the very bottom of the informal salaried sector (below 0.9 
minimum wages), but they are less affected among the self-employed and among the informal salaried 
that earn around one minimum wage.  
To conclude, it is worth noting that this paper has not provided a complete test of the effectiveness 
of the minimum wage policy regarding its potential to reduce poverty. To answer this question, one would 
have to produce direct estimates of the effects of minimum wages on household – rather than on 
individual – income. However, an alternative that could be pursued as an extension of the present paper is 
that of performing simulations of the effects of minimum wages on household income, by aggregating 
within each household the estimated effects on the earnings of individuals. Other extensions include the 
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics for Samples of Registered Employees(*)
Income / Sample N. Obs. Income Income Years of Age Women Age< 21 Heads Sample N. Obs. Income Income Years of Age Women Age< 21 Heads
Min. W. Fraction (Y1) (Y2) School. (%) (%) (%) Fraction (Y1) (Y2) School. (%) (%) (%)
[0.5, 0.9] 0.013 3536 120.1 183.6 4.0 34.3 0.64 0.19 0.32 0.015 4989 119.3 154.8 4.2 33.4 0.64 0.22 0.30
(0.9, 1.1] 0.112 31048 152.9 205.0 5.1 31.6 0.54 0.21 0.33 0.121 40961 151.5 178.8 5.2 31.1 0.55 0.23 0.31
(1.1, 1.5] 0.102 28173 211.2 262.5 5.5 31.4 0.45 0.19 0.41 0.107 36135 209.9 231.5 5.5 31.0 0.46 0.20 0.39
(1.5, 2.0] 0.130 36067 275.2 320.1 6.0 31.7 0.40 0.15 0.46 0.134 45197 272.8 286.7 6.0 31.4 0.41 0.16 0.44
(2.0, 2.5] 0.104 28952 351.2 388.4 6.3 32.4 0.35 0.11 0.52 0.105 35601 348.1 353.0 6.4 32.2 0.36 0.12 0.50
(2.5, 3.0] 0.078 21631 414.2 442.6 6.8 32.9 0.31 0.09 0.56 0.077 26122 410.6 408.2 6.8 32.9 0.32 0.09 0.55
(3.0, 3.5] 0.067 18664 489.5 510.0 7.0 33.3 0.29 0.07 0.59 0.066 22386 484.4 472.7 7.1 33.2 0.30 0.08 0.58
(3.5, 4.0] 0.056 15513 570.3 581.5 7.4 33.8 0.27 0.06 0.62 0.054 18386 565.6 546.3 7.5 33.8 0.28 0.06 0.61
(4.0, 5.0] 0.082 22657 672.1 667.0 7.8 34.5 0.25 0.04 0.66 0.078 26499 666.5 630.7 7.9 34.4 0.26 0.04 0.64
(5.0, 6.0] 0.050 13948 794.3 769.9 8.3 34.9 0.25 0.03 0.68 0.048 16214 786.8 730.5 8.4 34.9 0.27 0.03 0.66
(6.0, 9.0] 0.089 24614 1068.4 1017.5 9.4 35.5 0.25 0.02 0.70 0.084 28363 1061.6 974.2 9.5 35.6 0.26 0.02 0.68
(9.0, 12] 0.042 11741 1491.6 1397.6 10.7 36.2 0.23 0.01 0.73 0.040 13435 1478.2 1337.7 10.7 36.3 0.24 0.01 0.72
(12, 40] 0.075 20736 2770.6 2434.6 12.5 38.1 0.18 0.00 0.81 0.069 23403 2750.0 2355.0 12.5 38.3 0.19 0.00 0.80
Full Sample 1.000 277280 669.8 660.3 7.3 33.5 0.34 0.10 0.56 1.000 337691 639.1 599.8 7.3 33.2 0.36 0.11 0.53
(*) Sample means when not otherwise specified. (**) The income of unemployed and out-of-the-labor-force individuals is assumed to be zero. Inactive individuals include those in school and homekeepers.
Working, Unemployed or Inactive(**) Sample: Status in Year2                       Working as Registered Employee 
 
 
Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics for Samples of Un-Registered Employees(*)
Income / Sample N. Obs. Income Income Years of Age Women Age< 21 Heads Sample N. Obs. Income Income Years of Age Women Age< 21 Heads
Min. W. Fraction (Year 1) (Year 2) School. (%) (%) (%) Fraction (Year 1) (Year 2) School. (%) (%) (%)
0.5 - 0.9 0.113 6550 105.4 138.4 4.5 26.5 0.57 0.47 0.18 0.132 14091 105.5 123.1 4.7 26.8 0.59 0.44 0.18
0.9 - 1.1 0.126 7291 139.8 172.9 5.1 29.8 0.50 0.33 0.27 0.161 17262 140.2 157.3 5.4 28.9 0.53 0.34 0.24
1.1 - 1.5 0.095 5496 198.1 226.7 5.7 31.1 0.41 0.26 0.34 0.116 12367 197.6 214.0 5.7 30.1 0.42 0.27 0.32
1.5 - 2.0 0.098 5685 261.5 306.3 6.9 33.5 0.43 0.15 0.38 0.108 11578 256.6 279.4 6.6 32.3 0.41 0.18 0.39
2.0 - 2.5 0.078 4537 337.9 373.8 7.8 34.4 0.42 0.10 0.45 0.080 8607 333.0 350.9 7.3 33.5 0.39 0.13 0.45
2.5 - 3.0 0.064 3715 404.4 437.2 8.6 35.4 0.41 0.07 0.48 0.058 6180 396.6 415.8 8.1 34.9 0.40 0.08 0.49
3.0 - 3.5 0.058 3336 472.4 516.3 9.2 35.9 0.42 0.05 0.50 0.051 5471 462.5 485.9 8.7 35.2 0.39 0.06 0.51
3.5 - 4.0 0.053 3091 553.1 571.0 9.3 36.5 0.38 0.04 0.54 0.044 4752 546.8 552.6 8.9 36.2 0.37 0.05 0.55
4.0 - 5.0 0.074 4293 655.9 676.6 10.0 37.2 0.40 0.03 0.57 0.061 6546 649.3 653.2 9.6 36.9 0.38 0.03 0.57
5.0 - 6.0 0.049 2835 771.7 788.5 10.7 38.4 0.43 0.02 0.58 0.038 4060 762.7 759.0 10.4 38.0 0.41 0.02 0.58
6.0 - 9.0 0.088 5118 1033.6 982.7 11.4 38.7 0.40 0.01 0.62 0.069 7390 1027.3 962.4 11.1 38.5 0.38 0.01 0.62
9.0 - 12 0.040 2298 1413.2 1337.4 12.1 39.6 0.36 0.01 0.67 0.032 3440 1403.9 1285.4 11.9 39.4 0.35 0.01 0.67
12 - 40 0.063 3622 2585.1 2250.2 13.3 42.0 0.31 0.00 0.75 0.049 5196 2588.5 2168.8 13.0 41.8 0.29 0.00 0.75
Full Sample 1.000 57867 579.1 576.4 8.1 34.3 0.43 0.16 0.45 1.000 106940 495.5 480.3 7.5 32.9 0.44 0.19 0.42
(*) Sample means when not otherwise specified. (**) The income of unemployed and out-of-the-labor-force individuals is assumed to be zero. Inactive individuals include those in school and homekeepers.




Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics for Samples of Self-Employed Workers(*)
Income / Sample N. Obs. Income Income Years of Age Women Age< 21 Heads Sample N. Obs. Income Income Years of Age Women Age< 21 Heads
Min. W. Fraction (Year 1) (Year 2) School. (%) (%) (%) Fraction (Year 1) (Year 2) School. (%) (%) (%)
0.5 - 0.9 0.129 8020 102.8 154.5 3.6 40.1 0.63 0.05 0.43 0.151 14537 101.4 125.3 3.9 37.9 0.66 0.08 0.36
0.9 - 1.1 0.092 5702 140.3 204.2 4.1 40.5 0.49 0.03 0.53 0.099 9529 139.4 173.1 4.4 38.5 0.53 0.06 0.45
1.1 - 1.5 0.113 7021 196.2 249.7 4.0 40.3 0.43 0.03 0.58 0.120 11542 194.6 217.4 4.3 38.5 0.46 0.05 0.52
1.5 - 2.0 0.129 7986 252.7 302.6 4.5 40.6 0.35 0.02 0.65 0.126 12164 251.0 273.5 4.8 38.9 0.38 0.04 0.60
2.0 - 2.5 0.099 6166 334.3 366.2 4.8 40.4 0.29 0.02 0.71 0.095 9217 332.2 342.9 5.0 39.1 0.32 0.03 0.65
2.5 - 3.0 0.070 4377 376.1 401.9 5.1 40.5 0.25 0.01 0.73 0.065 6283 375.8 372.9 5.3 39.4 0.28 0.03 0.68
3.0 - 3.5 0.061 3776 445.8 459.5 5.4 40.4 0.23 0.01 0.75 0.056 5427 444.0 438.3 5.7 39.3 0.25 0.02 0.71
3.5 - 4.0 0.053 3272 547.2 514.1 5.5 40.7 0.21 0.01 0.77 0.049 4748 545.8 497.6 5.8 39.6 0.24 0.02 0.73
4.0 - 5.0 0.072 4448 638.7 595.6 6.2 40.6 0.20 0.01 0.78 0.065 6261 640.4 589.4 6.5 39.7 0.22 0.01 0.74
5.0 - 6.0 0.039 2416 703.8 668.3 6.7 40.7 0.19 0.01 0.79 0.036 3497 704.0 646.1 7.0 39.9 0.21 0.01 0.76
6.0 - 9.0 0.067 4164 996.4 837.6 7.6 40.7 0.18 0.01 0.80 0.063 6092 1004.0 835.0 7.9 39.9 0.20 0.01 0.77
9.0 - 12 0.032 1986 1311.3 1069.7 8.8 40.4 0.18 0.01 0.80 0.030 2898 1320.9 1090.2 9.1 39.8 0.20 0.01 0.76
12 - 40 0.045 2776 2450.0 1672.1 10.4 41.4 0.19 0.01 0.81 0.045 4368 2495.6 1727.2 10.8 40.8 0.19 0.00 0.80
Full Sample 1.000 62110 487.8 459.3 5.3 40.5 0.34 0.02 0.66 1.000 96563 474.7 427.6 5.5 39.0 0.38 0.04 0.60
(*) Sample means when not otherwise specified. (**) The income of unemployed and out-of-the-labor-force individuals is assumed to be zero. Inactive individuals include those in school and homekeepers.
Working, Unemployed or Inactive(**) Sample: Status in Year2                             Working as Self-Employed 
 
 
Table 4 - Effects of Minimum Wages on Monthly Income of Registered Workers: Current and Lagged 
Percent Yearly Changes in Income for Different Ranges of Income Relative to the Minimum Wage
(t-statistics are presented below their corresponding coefficients)
Sample: Status
in Year 2
Income Relative Current Lagged Current Lagged Current Lagged Current Lagged
to Minimum Wage: [1] [1'] [2] [2'] [3] [3'] [4] [4']
0.5 - 0.9 1.43 0.03 1.40 0.05 1.35 0.08 1.21 0.09
15.42 0.44 15.87 0.84 15.15 1.29 13.98 1.44
0.9 - 1.1 1.08 -0.17 1.08 -0.15 1.06 -0.12 0.98 -0.13
36.75 -7.97 37.88 -7.43 36.63 -5.69 34.05 -5.99
1.1 - 1.5 0.89 -0.07 0.90 -0.05 0.88 -0.02 0.82 -0.04
29.08 -3.11 30.54 -2.40 29.27 -0.80 27.49 -1.70
1.5 - 2.0 0.83 -0.06 0.82 -0.06 0.78 -0.04 0.74 -0.05
30.73 -2.71 31.15 -2.71 29.36 -1.92 27.77 -2.55
2.0 - 2.5 0.71 -0.07 0.70 -0.06 0.68 -0.056 0.66 -0.05
24.11 -2.93 24.15 -2.75 23.02 -2.48 22.13 -2.18
2.5 - 3.0 0.63 -0.15 0.61 -0.15 0.59 -0.14 0.58 -0.15
18.14 -5.45 17.90 -5.52 16.87 -5.13 16.24 -5.19
3.0 - 3.5 0.62 -0.15 0.58 -0.14 0.58 -0.11 0.58 -0.12
17.10 -5.12 16.22 -5.02 15.99 -3.92 15.58 -3.92
3.5 - 4.0 0.56 -0.11 0.54 -0.11 0.53 -0.10 0.55 -0.08
14.31 -3.57 14.02 -3.76 13.36 -3.27 13.73 -2.73
4.0 - 5.0 0.52 -0.11 0.52 -0.10 0.51 -0.09 0.52 -0.08
16.00 -4.21 16.10 -3.80 15.48 -3.33 15.53 -3.08
5.0 - 6.0 0.46 -0.19 0.44 -0.18 0.46 -0.15 0.47 -0.14
10.88 -5.18 10.58 -5.13 10.57 -4.21 10.66 -3.78
6.0 - 9.0 0.49 -0.16 0.48 -0.17 0.49 -0.14 0.51 -0.13
15.56 -6.49 15.46 -6.71 15.36 -5.57 15.61 -5.17
9.0 - 12 0.42 -0.20 0.40 -0.21 0.42 -0.19 0.43 -0.18
9.40 -5.24 9.06 -5.62 9.10 -5.00 9.25 -4.49
12 - 40 0.39 -0.24 0.38 -0.24 0.40 -0.22 0.43 -0.21
11.28 -8.78 11.13 -8.69 11.24 -7.82 11.95 -7.20
Adjusted R2
N
Coefficient estimates correspond to the percent change in monthly income after a 1 percent increase in minimum wages. In 
all columns, the sample is restricted to registered individuals working for a wage in year 1. In [1] and [1'], the sample is 
restricted to individuals in this same status in year 2. In [2] to [4'], the sample also includes individuals that in year 2 
are working as unregistered employees, self-employed or employers. In [3] to  [4'] unemployed individuals in year 2 
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Table 5 - Effects of Minimum Wages on Monthly Income of Un-Registered Workers: Current and Lagged 
Percent Yearly Changes in Income for Different Ranges of Income Relative to the Minimum Wage
(t-statistics are presented below their corresponding coefficients)
Sample: Status
in Year 2
Income Relative Current Lagged Current Lagged Current Lagged Current Lagged
to Minimum Wage: [1] [1'] [2] [2'] [3] [3'] [4] [4']
0.5 - 0.9 1.18 0.09 1.39 0.21 1.32 0.20 1.00 0.07
16.35 1.72 21.28 4.31 20.33 4.21 16.19 1.49
0.9 - 1.1 1.03 -0.10 1.12 -0.04 1.06 -0.02 0.84 -0.08
15.61 -1.98 20.04 -1.06 19.06 -0.51 15.47 -2.06
1.1 - 1.5 0.82 0.03 0.79 -0.03 0.70 -0.04 0.66 -0.03
11.27 0.44 12.74 -0.68 11.30 -0.91 10.77 -0.63
1.5 - 2.0 0.64 -0.20 0.68 -0.13 0.62 -0.14 0.56 -0.13
8.70 -3.35 10.74 -2.49 9.63 -2.75 8.77 -2.38
2.0 - 2.5 0.66 -0.10 0.73 -0.09 0.65 -0.092 0.64 -0.05
7.90 -1.49 10.04 -1.63 8.84 -1.63 8.56 -0.95
2.5 - 3.0 0.46 -0.26 0.49 -0.30 0.46 -0.28 0.43 -0.25
4.80 -3.53 5.57 -4.32 5.14 -3.94 4.71 -3.44
3.0 - 3.5 0.50 -0.20 0.55 -0.17 0.56 -0.15 0.56 -0.12
5.19 -2.69 6.06 -2.40 6.06 -2.08 5.96 -1.58
3.5 - 4.0 0.42 -0.25 0.46 -0.23 0.46 -0.21 0.50 -0.19
4.36 -3.48 5.01 -3.32 4.89 -2.88 5.17 -2.54
4.0 - 5.0 0.42 -0.19 0.47 -0.21 0.47 -0.18 0.53 -0.14
5.09 -2.88 5.85 -3.38 5.84 -2.83 6.29 -2.10
5.0 - 6.0 0.24 -0.32 0.32 -0.26 0.31 -0.25 0.37 -0.20
2.38 -3.78 3.13 -3.13 2.97 -2.92 3.44 -2.31
6.0 - 9.0 0.28 -0.28 0.34 -0.26 0.34 -0.25 0.40 -0.22
3.72 -4.67 4.54 -4.48 4.40 -4.20 5.05 -3.50
9.0 - 12 0.37 -0.06 0.43 -0.09 0.43 -0.07 0.50 -0.01
3.35 -0.67 4.12 -0.95 4.02 -0.80 4.45 -0.12
12 - 40 0.24 -0.31 0.28 -0.31 0.28 -0.28 0.37 -0.23
2.74 -4.29 3.20 -4.38 3.21 -3.97 4.04 -3.07
Adjusted R2
N
Coefficient estimates correspond to the percent change in monthly income after a 1 percent increase in minimum wages. In 
all columns, the sample is restricted to un-registered individuals working for a wage in year 1. In [1] and [1'], the sample is 
restricted to individuals in this same status in year 2. In [2] to [4'], the sample also includes individuals that in year 2 
are working as registered employees, self-employed or employers. In [3] to  [4'] unemployed individuals in year 2 














Table 6 - Effects of Minimum Wages on Monthly Income of Self-Employed Workers: Current and Lagged 
Percent Yearly Changes in Income for Different Ranges of Income Relative to the Minimum Wage
(t-statistics are presented below their corresponding coefficients)
Sample: Status
in Year 2
Income Relative Current Lagged Current Lagged Current Lagged Current Lagged
to Minimum Wage: [1] [1'] [2] [2'] [3] [3'] [4] [4']
0.5 - 0.9 1.18 0.26 1.21 0.19 1.13 0.21 0.82 0.15
13.45 3.87 15.56 3.33 14.58 3.67 11.73 2.82
0.9 - 1.1 1.32 0.34 1.31 0.25 1.24 0.24 0.98 0.15
12.90 4.28 14.45 3.63 13.78 3.44 11.61 2.35
1.1 - 1.5 0.77 0.11 0.89 0.06 0.86 0.06 0.75 0.05
8.60 1.66 11.49 1.08 11.16 0.99 10.14 0.85
1.5 - 2.0 0.63 0.08 0.63 0.01 0.60 0.01 0.54 0.00
7.41 1.07 8.39 0.21 7.89 0.22 7.39 0.04
2.0 - 2.5 0.59 0.16 0.66 0.13 0.65 0.161 0.65 0.17
6.01 2.13 7.65 2.01 7.52 2.42 7.66 2.56
2.5 - 3.0 0.33 -0.05 0.44 -0.03 0.44 -0.01 0.51 0.04
2.71 -0.48 4.02 -0.38 4.01 -0.15 4.64 0.48
3.0 - 3.5 0.38 -0.11 0.43 -0.14 0.43 -0.10 0.45 -0.07
2.80 -0.98 3.59 -1.45 3.55 -1.07 3.72 -0.74
3.5 - 4.0 0.48 0.11 0.48 0.10 0.47 0.11 0.50 0.10
3.94 1.09 4.41 1.15 4.25 1.30 4.58 1.18
4.0 - 5.0 0.65 0.11 0.71 0.12 0.71 0.14 0.75 0.17
5.79 1.26 7.11 1.54 7.05 1.74 7.46 2.08
5.0 - 6.0 0.13 -0.11 0.10 -0.20 0.09 -0.19 0.14 -0.13
0.83 -0.80 0.71 -1.64 0.64 -1.56 0.98 -1.10
6.0 - 9.0 0.38 0.03 0.36 0.01 0.39 0.03 0.43 0.04
3.40 0.37 3.75 0.09 3.93 0.34 4.39 0.51
9.0 - 12 0.12 -0.08 0.21 -0.09 0.21 -0.09 0.23 -0.09
0.74 -0.58 1.59 -0.80 1.57 -0.74 1.69 -0.77
12 - 40 0.22 -0.06 0.23 -0.14 0.25 -0.11 0.33 -0.07
1.69 -0.59 2.09 -1.55 2.25 -1.22 2.90 -0.72
Adjusted R2
N
Coefficient estimates correspond to the percent change in monthly income after a 1 percent increase in minimum wages. In 
all columns, the sample is restricted to self-employed working for a wage in year 1. In [1] and [1'], the sample is 
restricted to individuals in this same status in year 2. In [2] to [4'], the sample also includes individuals that in year 2 
are working as registered and unregistered employees, or employers. In [3] to  [4'] unemployed individuals in year 2 
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